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Hyatt: War in the Trenches

BOOK REVIEW

War in the Trenches
A.M.J. Hyatt
Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Wwjare: Technology and the
Canadian Corps 1914-1918. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1992.

his book should become a landmark in
Canadian historical study of the First
World War, for it breaks new ground, provokes
new questions and is clearly written. The
enormous number of casualties during that
war are still shocking, and seemed, until
recently, abundant proof of the tactical sterility
of war. For many years the war was seen as a
struggle between incompetent British generals
and naive politicians. Gradually that picture
has been redrawn into a more complicated and
more believable portrait. But the Western
front in the popular view has remained barren
of tactical ideas and innovation, hence
dramatically different from the Second World
War. Rawling presents a very different account.
He examines in detail the tools of war available
on the Western Front, the manner in which
these tools were used in the Canadian Corps as
well as how they were developed and modified.
More importantly, he concentrates on the way
training schemes and tactics were developed to
maximize the advantages of the tools and
minimize casualties. The story is long, complex
and inherently untidy, but it is well told and
carefully developed. Not least of the book's
merits is the fact that it avoids nationalistic
overtones which so often accompany military
history. It is a Canadian story which
acknowledges appropriate debt to the British
and to others.

T

The Canadian experience in 1915 was
painful. Poorly equipped and inadequately
trained, Canadian soldiers were simply not
ready for the situation which confronted them
when they reached France. (A situation more
or less mirrored a generation later?) Quickly a
process of development began, but it was slow,
continuous, and often brutal. While efforts
were made to have inadequate tools replaced
or modified (Colt machine guns, Ross rifles),
other efforts were made to develop new systems
incorporating unfamiliar weapons. Although
the results were no "guarantee to clear cut
victories," they were nonetheless significant.
Rawling argues that Canadians at the Somme
"learned that they had not learned
enough. "(p.86) By the Battle ofVimy Ridge the
Canadian Corps had developed a system of
tactics "based on available technology that
would allow the infantry to capture its objectives
and hold them without the heavy casualties of
earlier battles. "(p.88) In tracing such a process,
Rawling considers not only infantry, but
artillery, engineers, signallers, machine
gunners, the weapons and equipment they all
used, and the staff officers and commanders
who studies the results. By mid-191 7,
"Canadian tactics were a better guarantor of
success than the haphazard rushes of 1915,
but they did not ensure that individual units
would survive intact. "(p.142)
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At Passchendaele, usually considered the
epitome of slaughter without clear purpose,
Rawling shows that the development oftactical
methods for trench warfare reached a peak.
Perhaps no account of this horrible battle can
be completely satisfactory. Rawling's story
must inevitably be limited, and it sometimes
leaves the reader somewhat uncomfortable.
For example, his description ofthepreparations
for the attack on 6 November (all of which took
place in six days) can be justified by reference
to documents written after the attack, but it is
hard to believe that all of it could have happened
in the time available. ("Units tried to develop
the best methods of capturing pillboxes, strong
points, and machine-gun
emplacements, and they
relearned the techniques of fire
and movement, of leadership
and command. Training was
capped
with
full-dress
rehearsals." (p.l60) Following
the Passchendaele battle,
Canadians continued to train
hard and developed a system
that would provide success in a
modified form of open warfare.
The account of "the Last 100
Days," less fulsome than some
will wish, nonetheless is quite
adequate to support the story
which Rawling follows-the
development of tactical systems
and weapon techniques. He
concludes that Canadian
success in "the Last 100 Days"
of the war was remarkable, but notes that
casualties were also remarkable.
The cost of war is always too high, but the Canadian
Corps' last battles on the Western Front were less
costly than the disaster at Ypres or the massacre on
the Somme. In the cold-blooded calculus of war, one
trades territory or perhaps even the lives of one's own
troops for those of the enemy; in either case the
tactics
of fire
and
movement
proved
themselves. (p .215)

This book is important not only because it
traces the untold development of weapons and
tactics in the Canadian Corps, it also forces the
reader to think beyond 1918. In this sense it
contributes substantially to the notion that
1914-1918 and 1939-1945 were two segments

of the same conflict. Rawling misses no
opportunity to reflect on problems which were
as real in the second segment as they were in
the first. The impact of the tank (indeed of all
technology) in battle was overemphasized after
1918. In part this occurred because of the
understandable desire of all who participated
in the First World War to reduce casualties in
a future war by using machines instead of
men. But Rawling shows clearly that technology
produced success only when it was combined
with an effective tactical system, and when it
was used in a manner which aided the infantry
on the ground. Second World War planners
could have profited from examining Canadian
experience with tanks. As early
as the battle of Courcellette
Canadians concluded, "no
action of infantry should every
be made subservient to that of
tanks. Tanks are a useful
accessory to the infantry and
nothing more. "(83)
Later
Rawling notes that Canadian
experience at the Canal du Nord
was a "foreshadowing of the
next war, when artillery and
engineers in many theatres
would be hard-pressed to keep
tanks, artillery and truck-home
infantry moving over rivers and
rough terrain. "(21 0) The key to
the effective use of technology
in both wars is provided halfway through the book:
"technology
requires
technicians who know how to use it [and who
are] ... capable of applying available technology
to solve the tactical problems of the battlefield."
Like most outstanding works, this
stimulating book can be disappointing when
the author stumbles on a detail or fails to do
what the reviewer would prefer him to do.
Happily these details are few and far between,
usually insignificant. The most distressing
gaffwas misidentifYing an acount of the Canal
du Nord by a a survivor ofthe 13th Battalion as
testimony about Amiens.
My greatest
disappointment was the caution which Rawling
demonstrates in picking a side on the debate
over the efficacy of machine guns used for
indirect fire. Twice Rawling reviews the debate
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and indicates the nature of the controversy.
(178, 214) But in the end he goes no further
than his documents allow him to go. A
commendable position, but it prompts one to
ask how far can documents be trusted to
provide an accurate framework for a description
of the undescribable. Of course the question is
unanswerable, and it must be said that the
author provides all that he claims to and a
reviewer should expect no more. On the other
hand, the best thing about this book is that it
provokes reflection on as yet unanswerable
questions.

A.M.J. Hyatt is Professor and Chair, Department of History, University ofWestern
Ontario. His is the author of General Sir
Arthur Currie: A Military Biography, 1987.
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